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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 87-1167 
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER v. 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May 1, 1989] 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
In my view, to determine the proper approach to causation 
in this case, we need look only to the Court's opinion in Mt . 
Healthy City School Dist?·ict Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 
274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a public employee was not re-
hired, in part because of his exercise of First Amendment 
rights and in part because of permissible considerations. 
The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused "solely on 
whether protected conduct played a part, 'substantial' or oth-
erwise, in a decision not to rehire," on the grounds that such 
a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his 
constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. Id., at 
285. Instead, the Court outlined the following approach: 
"Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed 
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected, and that his conduct was a 'substan-
. tial factor' -or, to put it in other words, that it was a 
'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire 
him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, 
the District Court should have gone on to determine 
whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as 
to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the 
protected conduct." Id., at 287 (footnote omitted). 
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It is not necessary to get into semantic discussions on 
whether the Mt. Healthy approach is "but for" causation in 
another guise or creates an affirmative defense on the part of 
the employer to see its clear application to the issues before 
us in this case. As in Mt. Healthy, the District Court found 
that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and il-
legitimate factors. And here, as in Mt. Healthy, and as and 
the Court now holds, Hopkins was not required to prove that 
the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason 
for the petitioner's action. Rather, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
states, her burden was to show that the unlawful motive was 
a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. The 
District Court, as its opinion was construed by the Court of 
Appeals, so found, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321,333,334,825 F. 
2d 458, 470, 471 (1987), and I agree that the finding was 
supported by the record. The burden of persuasion then 
should have shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the 
same decision ... in the absence of" the unlawful motive. 
Mt. Healthy, supra, at 287. 
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that applying this ap-
proach to causation in Title VII cases is not a departure from 
and does not require modification of the Court's holdings in 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 
(1981), and McDonnell Douglas C01·p. v. Green, 411 U. S. 
792 (1973). The Court has made clear that "mixed motive" 
cases, such as the present one, are different from pretext 
cases such as McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine. In pretext 
cases, "the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, 
but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision." 
NLRB v. Tmnsportation Management C01·p. , 462 U. S. 393, 
400, n. 5 (1983). In mixed motive cases, however, there is 
no one "true" motive behind the decision. Instead, the deci-
sion is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is le-
gitimate. It can hardly be said that our decision in this case 
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is a departure from cases that are "inapposite." Ibid. I also 
disagree with the dissent's assertion that this approach to 
causation is inconsistent with our statement in Burdine that 
"[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff re-
mains at all times with the plaintiff." 450 U. S., at 253. As 
we indicated in Transportation Management Co1·p., the 
showing required by Mt. Healthy does not improperly shift 
from the plaintiff the ultimate burden of persuasion on 
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
him or her. See 462 U. S., at 400, n. 5. 
Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 
reached the same employment decision in the absence of the 
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy, I concur in 
the judgment reversing this case in part and remanding. 
With respect to the employer's burden, however, the plural-
ity seems to require, at least in most cases, that the employer 
submit objective evidence that the same result would have 
occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Ante, at 21. In 
my view, however, there is no special requirement that the 
employer carry its burden by objective evidence. In a 
mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive found would 
have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the em-
ployer credibly testifies that the action would have been 
taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample 
proof. This would even more plainly be the case where the 
employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but 
the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors 
motivated the adverse action.* 
*I agree with the plurality that if the employer carries this burden, 
there has been no violation of Title VIL 
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JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. 
Today the Court manipulates existing and complex rules 
for employment discrimination cases in a way certain to re-
sult in confusion. Continued adherence to the evidentiary 
scheme established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine is a 
wiser course than creation of more disarray in an area of the 
law already difficult for the bench and bar, and so I must 
dissent. 
Before turning to my reasons for disagreement with the 
Court's disposition of the case, it is important to review the 
actual holding of today's decision. I read the opinions as 
establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plain-
tiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of dis-
criminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision 
would have been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift 
in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff 
proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a sub-
stantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision. 
Ante, at 16-17 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at 2 (opinion 
of WHITE, J.). As the opinions make plain, the evidentiary 
scheme created today is not for every case in which a plaintiff 
produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace. Ante, 
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at 21 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); ante, at 17 (opinion of O'CON-
NOR, J.). 
Where the plaintiff makes the requisite showing, the bur-
den that shifts to the employer is to show that legitimate 
employment considerations would have justified the decision 
without reference to any impermissible motive. Ante, at 3 
(opinion of WHITE, J.); ante, at 18 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). 
The employer's proof on the point is to be presented and re-
viewed just as with any other evidentiary question: the Court 
does not accept the plurality's suggestion that an employer's 
evidence need be "objective" or otherwise out of the ordi-
nary. Ante, at 3 (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
In sum, the Court alters the evidentiary framework of 
McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine for a closely defined set 
of cases. Although JUSTICE O'CONNOR advances some 
thoughtful arguments for this change, I remain convinced 
that it is unnecessary and unwise. More troubling is the plu-
rality's rationale for today's decision, which includes a num-
ber of unfortunate pronouncements on both causation and 
methods of proof in employment discrimination cases. To 
demonstrate the defects in the plurality's reasoning, it is nec-
essary to discuss first, the standard of causation in Title VII 
cases, and second, the burden of proof. 
I 
The plurality describes this as a case about the standard of 
causation under Title VII, ante, at 7, but I respectfully sug-
gest that the description is misleading. Much of the plurali-
ty's rhetoric is spent denouncing a "but-for" standard of cau-
sation. The theory of Title VII liability the plurality adopts, 
however, essentially incorporates the but-for standard. The 
importance of today's decision is not the standard of causa-
tion it employs, but its shift to the defendant of the burden of 
proof. The plurality's causation analysis is misdirected, for 
it is clear that, whoever bears the burden of proof on the 
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tion. See also ante, at 2 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at 
3, n. (opinion of WHITE, J .). 
The words of Title VII are not obscure. The part of the 
statute relevant to this case provides that: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
"(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
By any normal understanding, the phrase "because of" con-
veys the idea that the motive in question made a• difference 
to the outcome. We use the words this way in everyday 
speech. And assuming, as the plurality does, that we ought 
to consider the interpretive memorandum prepared by the 
statute's drafters, we find that this is what the words meant 
to them as well. "To discriminate is to make a distinction, to 
make a difference in treatment or favor." 110 Cong. Rec. 
7213 (1964). Congress could not have chosen a clearer way 
to indicate that proof of liability under Title VII requires 
a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
caused the decision at issue. 
Our decisions confirm that Title VII is not concerned with 
the mere presence of impermissible motives; it is directed to 
employment decisions that result from those motives. The 
verbal formulae we have used in our precedents are synony-
mous with but-for causation. Thus we have said that pro-
viding different insurance coverage to male and female em-
ployees violates the statute by treating the employee "'in a 
manner which but-for that person's sex would be different.'" 
NewpO?'-t News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co . v. EEOC, 462 
U. S. 669, 683 (1983), quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 711 (1978). We have de-
scribed the relevant question as whether the employment de-
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cision was ''based on" a discriminatory criterion, Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977), or whether the 
particular employment decision at issue was "made on the 
basis of" an impermissible factor, Cooper v. Fedeml Reserve 
Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 875 (1984). 
What we term ''but-for" cause is the least rigorous stand-
ard that is consistent with the approach to causation our 
precedents describe. If a motive is not a but-for cause of 
an event, then by definition it did not make a difference to 
the outcome. The event would have occurred just the same 
without it. Common law approaches to causation of ten re-
quire proof of but-for cause as a starting point toward proof 
of legal cause. The law may require more than but-for 
cause, for instance proximate cause, before imposing lia-
bility. Any standard less than but-for, however, simply rep-
resents a decision to impose liability without causation. As 
Dean Prosser puts it, "[a]n act or omission is not regarded 
as a cause of an event if the particular event would have 
occurred without it." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & 
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 
1984). 
One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow 
confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to 
but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it has 
placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer. 
This approach conflates the question whether causation must 
be shown with the question of how it is to be shown. Be-
cause the plurality's theory of Title VII causation is ulti-
mately consistent with a but-for standard, it might be said 
that my disagreement with the plurality's comments on but-
for cause is simply academic. See ante, at 2 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.). But since those comments seem to influence the 
decision, I turn now to that part of the plurality's analysis. 
The plurality begins by noting the quite unremarkable fact 
that Title VII is written in the present tense. Ante, at 10. 
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benefits on the basis of sex, not "to have failed" or "to have 
refused" to have done so. The plurality claims that the pres-
ent tense excludes a but-for inquiry as the relevant standard 
because but-for causation is necessarily concerned with a hy-
pothetical inquiry into how a past event would have occurred 
absent the contested motivation. This observation, how-
ever, tells us nothing of particular relevance to Title VII or 
the cause of action it creates. I am unaware of any federal 
prohibitory statute that is written in the past tense. Every 
liability determination, including the novel one constructed 
by the plurality, necessarily is concerned with the exami-
nation of a past event. 1 The plurality's analysis of verb 
tense serves only to divert attention from the causation re-
quirement that is made part of the statute by the "because 
of" phrase. That phrase, I respectfully submit, embodies a 
rather simple concept that the plurality labors to ignore. 2 
We are told next that but-for cause is not required, since 
the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of." 
Ante, at 10. No one contends, however, that sex must be 
the sole cause of a decision before there is a Title VII viola-
tion. This is a separate question from whether consideration 
of sex must be a cause of the decision. Under the accepted 
1 The plurality's description of its own standard is both hypothetical and 
retrospective. The inquiry seeks to determine whether "if we asked the 
employer at the moment of decision what its reasons were and if we re-
ceived a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant 
or employee was a woman." Ante, at 20. 
2 The plurality's discussion of overdetermined causes only highlights the 
error of its insistence that but-for is not the substantive standard of causa-
tion under Title VIL The opinion discusses the situation where two physi-
cal forces move an object, and either force acting alone would have moved 
the object. Ante, at 11. Translated to the context of Title VII, this situa-
tion would arise where an employer took an adverse action in reliance both 
on sex and on legitimate reasons, and eithe1· the illegitimate or the legiti-
mate reason standing alone would have produced the action. If this state 
of affairs is proved to the factflnder, there will be no liability under the 
plurality's own test, for the same decision would have been made had the 
illegitimate reason never been considered. 
87-1167-DISSENT 
6 PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS 
approach to causation that I have discussed, sex is a cause for 
the employment decision whenever, either by itself or in 
combination with other factors, it made a difference to the 
decision. Discrimination need not be the sole cause in order 
for liability to arise, but merely a necessary element of the 
set of factors that caused the decision, i. e., a but-for cause. 
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Tmil Tmnportation Co., 427 
U. S. 273, 282, n. 10 (1976). The plurality seems to say that 
since we know the words ''because of" do not mean "solely be-
cause of," they must not mean "because of" at all. This does 
not follow, as a matter of either semantics or logic. 
The plurality's reliance on the "bona fide occupational 
qualification" (BFOQ) provisions of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(e), is particularly inapt. The BFOQ provisions 
allow an employer, in certain cases, to make an employment 
decision of which it is conceded that sex is the cause. That 
sex may be the legitimate cause of an employment decision 
where gender is a BFOQ is consistent with the opposite com-
mand that a decision caused by sex in any other case justifies 
the imposition of Title VII liability. This principle does not 
support, however, the novel assertion that a violation has oc-
curred where sex made no difference to the outcome. 
The most confusing aspect of the plurality's analysis of cau-
sation and liability is its internal inconsistency. The plural-
ity begins by saying: ''When ... an employer considers both 
gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a deci-
sion, that decision was 'because of' sex and the other, legiti-
mate considerations-even if we may say later, in the context 
of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if 
gender had not been taken into account." Ante, at 10. Yet 
it goes on to state that "an employer shall not be liable if it 
can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, 
it would have come to the same decision." Ante, at 12. 
Given the language of the statute, these statements cannot 
both be true. Title VII unambiguously states that an em-
ployer who makes decisions "because of" sex has violated the 
t, ) ~ 
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statute. The plurality's first statement therefore appears to 
indicate that an employer who considers illegitimate reasons 
when making a decision is a violator. But the opinion then 
tells us that the employer who shows that the same decision 
would have been made absent consideration of sex is not a vi-
olator. If the second statement is to be reconciled with the 
language of Title VII, it must be that a decision that would 
have been the same absent consideration of sex was not made 
"because of" sex. In other words, there is no violation of the 
statute absent but-for causation. The plurality's description 
of the "same decision" test it adopts supports this view. The 
opinion states that "[a] court that finds for a plaintiff under 
this standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate 
motive was a 'but-for' cause of the employment decision," 
ante, at 19, and that this "is not an imposition of liability 
'where sex made no difference to the outcome,'" ante, at 16, 
n. 11. 
The plurality attempts to reconcile its internal inconsis-
tency on the causation issue by describing the employer's 
showing as an "affirmative defense." This is nothing more 
than a label, and one not found in the language or legislative 
history of Title VII. Section 703(a)(l) is the statutory basis 
of the cause of action, and the Court is obligated to explain 
how its disparate treatment decisions are consistent with the 
terms of § 703(a)(l), not with general themes of legislative 
history or with other parts of the statute that are plainly in:-
apposite. While the test ultimately adopted by the plurality 
may not be inconsistent with the terms of § 703(a)(l), see 
infra, at 14, the same cannot be said of the plurality's reason-
ing with respect to causation. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR de-
scribes it, the plurality "reads the causation requirement out 
of the statute, and then replaces it with an 'affirmative de-
fense."' Ante, at 15. Labels aside, the import of today's 
decision is not that Title VII liability can arise without but-
for causation, but that in certain cases it is not the plaintiff 
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who must prove the presence of causation, but the defendant 
who must prove its absence. 
II 
We established the order of proof for individual Title VII 
disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and reaffirmed this allocation in 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 
(1981). Under Burdine, once the plaintiff presents a prima 
facie case, an inference of discrimination arises. The em-
ployer must rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The final burden 
of persuasion, however, belongs to the plaintiff. Burdine 
makes clear that the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier 
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id., at 
253. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. 
Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 29 (1978.) (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). 3 
I would adhere to this established evidentiary framework, 
which provides the appropriate standard for this and other 
individual disparate treatment cases. Today's creation of a 
new set of rules for "mixed-motive" cases is not mandated by 
the statute itself. The Court's attempt at refinement pro-
vides limited practical benefits at the cost of confusion and 
complexity, with the attendent risk that the trier of fact will 
misapprehend the controlling legal principles and reach an in-
correct decision. 
In view of the plurality's treatment of BU?·dine and our 
other disparate treatment cases, it is important first to state 
why those cases are dispositive here. The plurality tries to 
3 The interpretive memorandum on which the plurality relies makes 
plain that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of prov-
ing that discrimination had occurred." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964). Cou-
pled with its earlier definition of discrimination, the memorandum tells us 
that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an impermissible motive 
"made a difference" in the treatment of the plaintiff. This is none other 
than the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show but-for cause. 
, . .J. ,,,.. 
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reconcile its approach with Burdine by announcing that it ap-
plies only to a "pretext" case, which it defines as a case in 
which the plaintiff attempts to prove that the employer's 
proffered explanation is itself false. Ante, at 15-17, and 
n. 11. This ignores the language of BU?·dine, which states 
that a plaintiff may succeed in meeting her ultimate burden of 
persuasion "either directly by persuading the court that a dis-
criminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or in-
directly by showing that the employer's proffered explana-
tion is unworthy of credence." 450 U. S., at 256 (emphasis 
added). Under the first of these two alternative methods, a 
plaintiff meets her burden if she can "persuade the court that 
the employment decision more likely than not was motivated 
by a discriminatory reason._~• USPS Board of Governm·s v. 
Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 717-718 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J ., con-
curring). The plurality makes no attempt to address this as-
pect of our cases. 
Our opinions make plain that BU?·dine applies to all indi-
vidual disparate treatment cases, whether the plaintiff offers 
direct proof that discrimination motivated the employer's 
actions or chooses the indirect method of showing that the 
employer's proffered justification is false, that is to say, a 
pretext. See Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 3 ("As in any law-
suit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstan-
tial evidence"). The plurality is mistaken in suggesting that 
the plaintiff in a so-called "mixed motives" case will be dis-
advantaged by having to "squeeze her proof into Burdine's 
framework." Ante, at 16. As we acknowledged in McDon-
nell Douglas, "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII 
cases," and the specification of the prima facie case set forth 
there "is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differ-
ing factual situations." 411 U. S., at 802, n. 13. The frame-
work was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritual-
istic." Aikens, 460 U. S., at 715. BU?·dine compels the 
employer to come forward with its explanation of the decision 
and permits the plaintiff to offer evidence under either of the 
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logical methods for proof of discrimination. This is hardly a 
framework that confines the plaintiff; still less is it a justifica-
tion for saying that the ultimate burden of proof must be on 
the employer in a mixed motives case. BU?·dine provides an 
orderly and adequate way to place both inferential and direct 
proof before the factfinder for a determination whether inten-
tional discrimination has caused the employment decision. 
Regardless of the character of the evidence presented, we 
have consistently held that the ultimate burden "remains at 
all times with the plaintiff." Bu1·dine, 450 U. S., at 253. 
Aikens illustrates the point. There, the evidence showed 
that the plaintiff, a black man, was far more qualified than 
any of the white applicants promoted ahead of him. More 
important, the testimony showed that "the person responsi-
ble for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous 
derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in 
particular." 460 U. S., at 713-714, n. 2. Yet the Court in 
Aikens reiterated that the case was to be tried under the 
proof scheme of Burdine. JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN concurred to stress that the plaintiff could prevail 
under the Burdine scheme in either of two ways, one of 
which was directly to persuade the court that the employ-
ment decision was motivated by discrimination. 460 U. S., 
at 718. Aikens leaves no doubt that the so-called "pretext" 
framework of Burdine has been considered to provide a flexi-
ble means of addressing all individual disparate treatment 
claims. 
Downplaying the novelty of its opinion, the plurality claims 
to have followed a "well-worn path" from our prior cases. 
The path may be well-worn, but it is in the wrong forest. 
The plurality again relies on Title VII's BFOQ provisions, 
under which an employer bears the burden of justifying the 
use of a sex-based employment qualification. See Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337 (1977). In the BFOQ 
context this is a sensible, indeed necessary, allocation of the 
burden, for there by definition sex is the but-for cause of 
J. 
87-1167-DISSENT 
PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPIGNS 11 
the employment decision and the only question remaining is 
how the employer can justify it. The same is true of the plu-
rality's citations to Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases, 
ante, at 18. In such cases there is no question that preg-
nancy was the cause of the disputed action. The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and BFOQ cases tell us nothing about the 
case where the employer claims not that a sex-based decision 
was justified, but that the decision was not sex-based at all. 
Closer analogies to the plurality's new approach are found 
in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 
(1977), and NRLB v. Transportation Management Corp., 
462 U. S. 393 (1983), but these cases were decided in differ-
ent contexts. Mt. Healthy was a First Amendment case in-
volving the firing of a teacher, and Transportation Manage-
ment involved review of the NLRB's interpretation of the 
National Labor Relations Act. The Transportation Man-
agement decision was based on the deference that the Court 
traditionally accords NLRB interpretations of the statutes it 
administers. See 462 U. S., at 402-403. Neither case 
therefore tells us why the established Burdine framework 
should not continue to govern the order of proof under Title 
VII. 
In contrast to the plurality, JUSTICE O'CONNOR acknowl-
edges that the approach adopted today is a "departure from 
the McDonnell Douglas standard." Ante, at 1. Although 
her reasons for supporting this departure are not without 
force, they are not dispositive. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
states, the most that can be said with respect to the Title VII 
itself is that ''nothing in the language, history, or purpose 
of Title VII prohibits adoption" of the new approach. Ante, 
at 9 (emphasis added). JUSTICE O'CONNOR also relies on 
analogies from the common law of torts, other types of Title 
VII litigation, and our equal protection cases. These analo-
gies demonstrate that shifts in the burden of proof are not 
unprecedented in the law of torts or employment discrimi-
nation. Nonetheless, I believe continued adherence to the 
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Burdine framework is more consistent with the statutory 
mandate. Congress' manifest concern with preventing im-
position of liability in cases where discriminatory animus did 
not actually cause an adverse action, see ante, at 2 (opinion 
of O'CONNOR, J.), suggests to me that an affirmative showing 
of causation should be required. And the most relevant por-
tion of the legislative history supports just this view. See 
n. 3, sup?·a. The limited benefits that are likely to be pro-
duced by today's innovation come at the sacrifice of clarity 
and practical application. 
The potential benefits of the new approach, in my view, are 
overstated. First, the Court makes clear that the Price 
Wate1·lwuse scheme is applicable only in those cases where 
the plaintiff has produced direct and substantial proof that an 
impermissible motive was relied upon in making the decision 
at issue. The burden shift properly will be found to apply in 
only a limited number of employment discrimination cases. 
The application of the new scheme, furthermore, will make a 
difference only in a smaller subset of cases. The practical 
importance of the burden of proof is the "risk of nonpersua-
sion," and the new system will make a difference only where 
the evidence is so evenly balanced that the factfinder cannot 
say that either side's explanation of the case is "more likely" 
true. This category will not include cases in which the allo-
cation of the burden of proof will be dispositive because of a 
complete lack of evidence on the causation issue, cf. Sum-
1ners v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948) (allocation 
of burden dispositive because no evidence of which of two 
negligently fired shots hit plaintiff). Rather, Price Wate1·-
lwuse will apply only to cases in which there is substantial 
evidence of reliance on an impermissible motive, as well 
as evidence from the employer that legitimate reasons sup-
ported its action. 
Although the Price Waterhouse system is not for every 
case, almost every plaintiff is certain to ask for a Price 
Waterlwuse instruction, perhaps on the basis of "stray re-
h ,. 
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marks" or other evidence of discriminatory animus. Trial 
and appellate courts will therefore be saddled with the task of 
developing standards for determining when to apply the bur-
den shift. One of their new tasks will be the generation of a 
jurisprudence of the meaning of "substantial factor." Courts 
will also be required to make the of ten subtle and difficult dis-
tinction between "direct" and "indirect" or "circumstantial" 
evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying 
McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine. Addition of a second bur-
den-shifting mechanism, the application of which itself de-
pends on assessment of credibility and a determination 
whether evidence is sufficiently direct and substantial, is not 
likely to lend clarity to the process. The presence of an ex-
isting burden-shifting mechanism distinguishes the individual 
disparate treatment case from the tort, class action dis-
crimination, and equal protection cases on which JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR relies. The distinction makes JUSTICE WHITE'S 
assertions that one "need look only to" Mt. Healthy and 
Transportation Management to resolve this case, and that 
our Title VII cases in this area are "inapposite," ante, at 1-3, 
at best hard to understand. 
Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mecha-
nisms will be most acute in cases brought under § 1981 or 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where 
courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct 
of jury trials. See, e.g., Note, The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 and Tri~l by Jury: Proposals for 
Change, 73 Va. L. Rev. 601 (1987) (noting high reversal rate 
caused by use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting). 
Perhaps such cases in the future will require a bifurcated 
trial, with the jury retiring first to make the credibility find-
ings necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has proved 
that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the 
decision, and later hearing evidence on the "same decision" or 
''pretext" issues. Alternatively, perhaps the trial judge will 
have the unenviable task of formulating a single instruction 
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for the jury on all of the various burdens potentially involved 
in the case. 
I do not believe the minor refinement in Title VII proce-
dures accomplished by today's holding can justify the difficul-
ties that will accompany it. Rather, I "remain confident that 
the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff mer-
iting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination." Bur-
dine, 450 U. S., at 258. Although the employer does not 
bear the burden of persuasion under Burdine, it must offer 
clear and reasonably specific reasons for the contested deci-
sion, and has every incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the decision was lawful. Ibid. Further, the suggestion that 
the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to su-
perior access to evidence has little force in the Title VII con-
text, where the liberal discovery rules available to all liti-
gants are supplemented by EEOC investigatory files. Ibid. 
In sum, the Burdine framework provides a "sensible, orderly 
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience 
as it bears on the critical question of discrimination," Aikens, 
460 U. S., at 715, and it should continue to govern the order 
of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases. 4 
'The plurality states that it disregards the special context of affirmative 
action. Ante, at 8, n. 3. It is not clear that this is possible. Some courts 
have held that in a suit challenging an affirmative action plan, the question 
of the plan's validity need not be reached unless the plaintiff shows that the 
plan was a but-for cause of the adverse decision. See McQuillen v. Wis-
ccmsin Education Associaticm C01mcil, 830 F. 2d 659, 665 (CA7 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U. S. 914 (1988). Presumably it will be easier for a plain-
tiff to show that consideration of race or sex pursuant to an affirmative 
action plan was a substantial factor in a decision, and the court will need 
to move on to the question of a plan's validity. Moreover, if the structure 
of the burdens of proof in Title VII suits is to be consistent, as might 
be expected given the identical statutory language involved, today's deci-
sion suggests that plaintiffs should no longer bear the burden of showing 
that affirmative action plans are illegal. See Johnson v. Transportation 
Agerlcy, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627 (1987). 
• 
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III 
The ultimate question in every individual disparate treat-
ment case is whether discrimination caused the particular de-
cision at issue. Some of the plurality's comments with re-
spect to the District Court's findings in this case, however, 
are potentially misleading. As the plurality notes, the Dis-
trict Court based its liability determination on expert evi-
dence that some evaluations of respondent Hopkins were 
based on unconscious sex stereotypes, 0 and on the fact that 
Price Waterhouse failed to disclaim reliance on these com-
ments when it conducted the partnership review. The Dis-
trict Court also based liability on Price Waterhouse's failure 
to "make partners sensitive to the dangers [of stereotyping], 
to discourage comments tainted by sexism, or to investigate 
comments to determine whether they were influenced-by ste-
reotypes." 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (DC 1985). 
Although the District Court's version of Title VII liability 
is improper under any of today's opinions, I think it impor-
tant to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of 
action for sex stereotyping. Evidence of use by decision-
makers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the 
question of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question, 
'The plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should have 
no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision. 
Price Waterhouse chose not to object to Fiske's testimony, and at this 
late stage we are constrained to accept it, but I think the plurality's en-
thusiasm for Fiske's conclusions unwarranted. Fiske purported to discern 
stereotyping in comments that were gender neutral-e. g., "overbearing 
and abrasive"-without any knowledge of the comments' basis in reality 
and without having met the speaker or subject. "To an expert of Dr. 
Fiske's qualifications, it seems plain that no woman could be overbearing, 
arrogant, or abrasive: any observations to that effect would necessarily 
be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is 
to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base any adverse action as 
to a woman on such attributes." 825 F . 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J ., 
dissenting). Today's opinions cannot be read as requiring factftnders to 
credit testimony based on this type of analysis. See also ante, at 17 (opin-
ion of O'CONNOR, J.). 
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however, is whether discrimination caused the plaintiff's 
harm. Our cases do not support the suggestion that failure 
to "disclaim reliance" on stereotypical comments itself vio-
lates Title VII. Neither do they support creation of a "duty 
to sensitize." As the dissenting judge in the Court of Ap-
peals observed, acceptance of such theories would turn Title 
VII "from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an en-
gine for rooting out sexist thoughts." 263 U. S. App. D. C. 
321, 340, 825 F. 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J ., dissenting). 
Employment discrimination claims require factfinders to 
make difficult and sensitive decisions. Sometimes this may 
mean that no finding of discrimination is justified even 
though a qualified employee is passed over by a less than ad-
mirable employer. In other cases, Title VII's protections 
properly extend to plaintiffs who are by _no means model em-
ployees. As JUSTICE BRENNAN notes, ante, at 28, courts do 
not sit to determine whether litigants are nice. In this case, 
Hopkins plainly presented a strong case both of her own pro-
fessional qualifications and of the presence of discrimination 
in Price Waterhouse's partnership process. Had the District 
Court found on this record that sex discrimination caused the 
adverse decision, I doubt it would have been reversible 
error. Cf. Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 2. That decision 
was for the finder of fact, however, and the District Court 
made plain that sex discrimination was not a but-for cause of 
the decision to place Hopkin's partnership candidacy on hold. 
Attempts to evade tough decisions by erecting novel theories 
of liability or multitiered systems of shifting burdens are 
misguided. 
IV 
The language of Title VII and our well-considered prece-
dents require this plaintiff to establish that the decision 
to place her candidacy on hold was made "because of" sex. 
Here the District Court found that the "comments of the indi-
vidual partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not 
prove an intentional discriminatory motive or purpose," 618 
,. 
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F. Supp., at 1118, and that "[b]ecause plaintiff has con-
siderable problems dealing with staff and peers, the Court 
cannot say that she would have been elected to partnership 
if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted by sexu-
ally based evaluations," id., at 1120. Hopkins thus failed 
to meet the requisite standard of proof after a full trial. I 
would remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of Price 
Waterhouse. 
.. 
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PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER v. 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
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APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May 1, 1989] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the plurality that on the facts presented in this 
case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer 
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hop-
kins' candidacy absent consideration of her gender. I fur-
ther agree that this burden shift is properly part of the lia-
bility phase of the litigation. I thus concur in the judgment 
of the Court. My disagreement stems from the plurality's 
conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causa-
tion under the statute and its broad statements regarding 
the applicability of the allocation of the burden of proof ap-
plied in this case. The evidentiary rule the Court adopts 
today should be viewed as a supplement to the careful frame-
work established by our unanimous decisions in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981), for use in cases such as this one where the employer 
has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving 
substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. I write 
separately to explain why I believe such a departure from 
the McDonnell Douglas standard is justified in the circum-
stances presented by this and like cases, and to express my 
views as to when and how the strong medicine of requiring 
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the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of 
causation should be administered. 
I 
Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin." 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a) (emphasis 
added). The legislative history of Title VII bears out what 
its plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the 
statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate cri-
terion is the ~'but-for" cause of an adverse employment ac-
tion. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress 
was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the em-
ployment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts. Critics 
of the bill that became Title VII labeled it a "thought control 
bill," and argued that it created a "punishable crime that does 
not require an illegal external act as a basis for judgment." 
100 Cong. Rec. 7254 (1964). Senator Case, whose views the 
plurality finds so persuasive elsewhere, responded: 
"The man must do or fail to do something in regard to 
employment. There must be some specific external act, 
more than a mental act. Only if he does the act because 
of the grounds stated in the bill would there be any legal 
consequences." Ibid. 
Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum that the words 
''because of" do not mean "but-for" causation; manifestly they 
do. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 499 
(1986) (WHITE, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he general policy under 
Title VII is to limit relief for racial discrimination in employ-
ment practices to actual victims of the discrimination"). We 
should not, and need not, deviate from that policy today. 
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burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms 
with the intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title 
VII. 
The evidence of congressional intent as to which party 
should bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation is 
considerably less clear. No doubt, as a general matter, Con-
gress assumed that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would 
bear the burden of proof on the elements critical to his or 
her case. As the dissent points out, post, at 8, n. 3, the 
interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title 
VII indicates that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would 
have the burden of proving that discrimination had oc-
curred." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (emphasis added). 
But in the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent's 
''but-for" standard of causation is derived, see post, at 4, the 
law has long recognized that in certain "civil cases" leaving 
the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove "but-for" 
causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deter-
rent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care. 
Thus, in multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has 
been established, the common law of torts has long shifted 
the burden of proof to multiple defendants to prove that their 
negligent actions were not the ''but-for" cause of the plaintiffs 
injury. See e. g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-87, 199 
P. 2d 1, 3-4 (1948). The same rule has been applied where 
the effect of a defendant's tortious conduct combines with a 
force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to 
the plaintiff. See Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 191 
Wis. 610, 616, 211 N. W. 913, 915 (1927) ("Granting that the 
union of that fire [caused by defendant's negligence] with an-
other of natural origin, or with another of much greater pro-
portions, is available as a defense, the burden is on the de-
fendant to show that . . . the fire set by him was not the 
proximate cause of the damage"). See also 2 J. Wigmore, 
Select Cases on the Law of Torts, § 153, p. 865 (1912) (''When 
two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause 
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of a harm, or when two or more acts of the same person are 
possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff has introduced evi-
dence that one of the two persons, or one of the same per-
son's two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden 
of proving that the other person, or his other act, was the 
sole cause of the harm"). 
While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title 
VII action prove that the defendant's "breach of duty'' was 
the ''but-for" cause of an injury does not generally hamper 
effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of 
action, 
"at other times the [but-for] test demands the impos-
sible. It challenges the imagination of the trier to probe 
into a purely fanciful and unlmowable state of affairs. 
He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that 
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to 
what might have happened opens the door wide for con-
jecture. But when conjecture is demanded it can be 
given a direction that is consistent with the policy 
considerations that underlie the controversy." Malone, 
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 67 
(1956). 
Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment 
"tort" created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first 
is to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary 
to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As we 
have noted in the past, the award of backpay to a Title VII 
plaintiff provides ''the spur or catalyst which causes employ-
ers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as 
possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination in employment. 
Albemare Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) 
(citation omitted). The second goal of Title VII is "to make 
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful 
employment discrimination." Id., at 418. 
-- - ., - . -. - . - . .- . . ·, 
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Both these goals are reflected in the elements of a dispar-
ate treatment action. There is no doubt that Congress con-
sidered reliance on gender or race in making employment de-
cisions an evil in itself. As Senator Clark put it, "[t]he bill 
simply eliminates consideration of color [or other forbidden 
criteria] from the decision to hire or promote." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 7218 (1964). See also id., at 13088 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Humphrey) (''What the bill does ... is simply to make it 
an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employ-
ment"). Reliance on such factors is exactly what the threat 
of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main 
concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, 
Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which 
co]11es fro_m being evaluated by a process which treats one as 
an inferior by reason of one's race or sex. This Court's deci-
sions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recog-
nized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, 
the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms 
both society and the individual. See Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co., 488 U. S. -- (1989). At the same time, Con-
gress clearly conditioned legal liability on a determination 
that the con·sideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangi-
ble employment injury of some kind. 
Where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegiti-
mate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse em-
ployment decision, the deterrent purpose of the statute has 
clearly been triggered. More importantly, as an evidentiary 
matter, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that absent 
further explanation, the employer's discriminatory motiva-
tion "caused" the employment decision. The employer has 
not yet been shown to be a violator, but neither is it entitled 
to the same presumption of good faith concerning its employ-
ment decisions which is accorded employers facing only cir-
cumstantial evidence of discrimination. Both the policies be-
hind· the statute, and the evidentiary principles developed in 
.... .. ··- ·•·;-, ·· -- ·:--. ···- ·· · . ••· · ·· ·• - · 
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the analogous area of causation in the law of torts, suggest 
that at this point the employer may be required to convince 
the factfinder that, despite the smoke, there is no fire. 
We have given recognition to these principles in our cases 
which have discussed the ''remedial phase" of class action dis-
parate treatment cases. Once the class has established that 
discrimination against a protected group was essentially the 
employer's "standard practice," there has been harm to the 
group and injunctive relief is appropriate. But as to the in-
dividual members of the class, the liability phase of the litiga-
tion is not complete. See Dillon v. Coles, 746 F . 2d 998, 
1004 (CA3 1984) ("It is misleading to speak of the additional 
proof required by ,an individual class member for relief as 
being a part of the damage phase, that evidence is actually 
an element of the liability portion of the case") (footnote omit-
ted). Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a 
rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's 
decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate 
that the individual applicant was denied an employment 
opportunity for legitimate reasons." Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324, 362 (1977). See also Franks v. Bow-
. man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 772 (1976). 
The individual members of a class action treatment case 
stand in much the same position as Ann Hopkins here. 
There has been a strong showing that the employer has done 
exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between 
the employer's illegitimate motivation and any injury to the 
individual plaintiff is unclear. At this point calling upon the 
employer to show that despite consideration of illegitimate 
factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or 
promoted in any event hardly seems "unfair" or contrary to 
the substantive command of the statute. In fact, an individ-
ual plaintiff who has shown that an illegitimate factor played 
a substantial role in the decision in her case has proved more 
than the class member in a Teamsters type action. The lat-
ter receives the benefit of a burden shift to the def end ant 
,., 
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based on the likelihood that an illegitimate criterion was a 
factor in the individual employment decision. 
There is a tension between the Franks and Teamsters 
line of decisions and the individual treatment cases cited 
by the dissent. See post, at 8-10. Logically, under the dis-
sent's view, each member of a disparate treatment class ac-
tion would have to show ''but-for" causation as to his or her 
individual employment decision, since it is not an element 
of the pattern or practice proof of the entire class and it is 
statutorily mandated that the plaintiff bear the burden of 
proof on this issue throughout the litigation. While the 
Court has properly drawn a distinction between the elements 
of a class action claim and an individual treatment claim, see 
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 
867, 873-878 (1984), and I do not suggest the wholesale trans-
position of rules from one setting to the other, our decisions 
in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that pre-
sumptions shifting the burden of persuasion based on eviden-
tiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute are not 
alien to our Title VII jurisprudence. 
Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant in this case 
to prove that the same decision would have been justified by 
legitimate reasons is consistent with our interpretation of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Like a dispar-
ate treatment plaintiff, one who asserts that governmental 
action violates the Equal Protection Clause must show that 
he or she is, "the victim of intentional discrimination." 
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 256. Compare post, at 8, 11 (KEN-
NEDY, J., dissenting) with Washington v. Dams, 426 U. S. 
229, 240 (1976). In Alexander v. Lousiana, 405 U. S. 625 
(1972), we dealt with a criminal defendant's allegation that 
members of his race had been invidiously excluded from the 
grand jury which indicted him in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. In addition to the statistical evidence pre-
sented by petitioner in that case, we noted that the State's 
"selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." 
•·---' ~-.., ,.-- .... ~- ~ -,-..- _, - -~ .... ,.~ ..- .,_.,.. ; •• . 
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Id., at 630. Once the consideration of race in the decisional 
process had been established, we held that "the burden of 
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of uncon-
stitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral 
selection criteria and procedures have produced the mono-
chromatic result." Id., at 632. 
We adhered to similar principles in Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), a case 
which, like this one, presented the problems of motivation 
and causation in the context of a multimember decisionmak-
ing body authorized to consider a wide range of factors in 
arriving at its decisions. In Arlington Heights a group of 
minority plaintiffs claimed that a municipal governing body's 
refusal to rezone a plot of land to allow for the construction 
of low-income integrated housing was racially motivated. 
On the issue of causation, we indicated that the plaintiff was 
not required 
"to prove that the challenged action rested solely on 
racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said 
that a legislature or administrative body operating under 
a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a 
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 
'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legis-
lators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that 
courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their deci-
sions, absent a showing of arbitrariness of irrationality. 
But racial discrimination is not just another competing 
consideration. When there is a proof that a discrimina-
tory purpose has been a motivating factor in the deci-
sion, this judicial deference is no longer justified." Id., 
at 265-266 (citation omitted). 
If the strong presumption of regularity and rationality of 
legislative decisionmaking must give way in the face of evi-
dence that race has played a significant part in a legisla-
tive decision, I simply cannot believe that Congress intended 
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Title VII to accord more deference to a private employer 
in the face of evidence that its decisional process has been 
substantially infected by discrimination. Indeed, where a 
public employee brings a "disparate treatment" claim under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause the em-
ployee is entitled to the favorable evidentiary framework of 
Arlington Heights. See, e.g., Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 
787 F . 2d 1223, 1233-1234 (CA8 1986) (applying Arlington 
Heights to public employee's claim of sex discrimination in 
promotion decision); Lee v. Russell County Board of Educa-
tion, 684 F. 2d 769, 773-774 (CAll 1982) (applying Arlington 
Heights to public employees' claims of race discrimination in 
discharge case). Under the dissent's reading of Title VII, 
Congress' extension of the coverage of the statute to public 
employers in 1972 has placed these employees under a less 
favorable evidentiary regime. In my view, nothing in the 
language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption 
of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion 
on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns 
would have justified an adverse employment action where 
the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden fac-
tor played a substantial role in the employment decision. 
Even the dissenting judge below "[had] no quarrel with [the] 
principle" that "a party with one permissible motive and one 
unlawful one may prevail only by affirmatively proving that 
it would have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive 
were absent." 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 341, 825 F. 2d 458, 
478 (1987) (Williams, J. dissenting). 
II 
The dissent's summary of our individual disparate treat-
ment cases to date is fair and accurate, and amply demon-
strates that the rule we adopt today is a at least a change 
in dir~ction from some of our prior precedents. See post, 
at 8-10. We have indeed emphasized in the past that in an 
individual disparate treatment action the plaintiff bears the 
- ..... . ,,~~· - ....... 
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burden of persuasion throughout the litigation. Nor have 
we confined the word "pretext" to the narrow definition 
which the plurality attempts to pin on it today. See ante, 
at 15-17. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly contem-
plated that a disparate treatment plaintiff could show that 
the employer's proffered explanation for an event was not 
"the true reason" either because it it never motivated the em-
ployer in its employment decisions or because it did not do so 
in a particular case. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine as-
sumed that the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion 
as to both these attacks, and we clearly depart from that 
framework today. Such a departure requires justification, 
and its outlines should be carefully drawn. 
First, McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with a situation 
where the plaintiff presented no direct evidence that the em-
ployer had relied on a forbidden factor under Title VII in 
making an employment decision. The prima facie case es-
tablished there was not difficult to prove, and was based only 
on the statistical probability that when a number of potential 
causes for an employment decision are eliminated an infer-
ence arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motiva-
tion behind the decision. See Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 358, 
n. 44 ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require 
direct proof of discrimination"). In the face of this inferen-
tial proof, the employer's burden was deemed to be only one 
of production; the employer must articulate a legitimate rea-
son for the adverse employment action. See Furnco Con-
struction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978). The 
plaintiff must then be given an "opportunity to demonstrate 
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons 
for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discrimi-
natory decision." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 805. 
Our decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), also involved the "narrow 
question" whether, after a plaintiff had carried the ''not oner-
ous" burden of establishing the prima facie case under Mc-
, - -~--,-,-... - ~,.·- - ,-•---- - - • ..... - -
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Donnell Douglas, the burden of persuasion should be shifted 
to the employer to prove that a legitimate reason for the ad-
verse employment action existed. 450 U. S., at 250. As 
the discussion of Teamsters and Arlington Heights indicates, 
I do not think that the employer is entitled to the same pre-
sumption of good faith where there is direct evidence that it 
has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration 
is forbidden by Title VII. 
The only individual treatment case cited by the dissent 
which involved the kind of direct evidence of discriminatory 
animus with which we are confronted here is United States 
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 
713-714, n. 2 (1983). The question presented to the Court 
in that case involved only a challenge to _the elements of the 
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, see 
Pet. for Cert. in United States Postal Service Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Aiken, 0. T. 1981, No. 1044, and the question we 
confront today was neither briefed nor argued to the Court. 
As should be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that 
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come 
by. That the employer's burden in rebutting such an infer-
ential case of discrimination is only one of production does not 
mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner 
where there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination. 
Indeed, in one Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, 
the Court seemed to indicate that "the McDonnell Douglas 
test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evi-
dence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985). See also East Texas 
Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404, n. 9 (1977). 
Second, the facts of this case, and a growing number like 
it decided by the Courts of Appeals, convince me that the evi-
dentiary standard I propose is necessary to make real the 
promise of McDonnell Douglas that "[i]n the implementation 
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of [employment] decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title 
VII tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 
411 U. S., at 801. In this case, the District Court found that 
a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by 
partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform 
to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against 
her election to the partnership. 618 F. Supp. 1109, 
1116-1117 (1985). The District Court further found that 
these evaluations were given "great weight" by the 
decisionmakers at Price Waterhouse. Id., at 1118. In addi-
tion, the District Court found that the partner responsible for 
informing Hopkins of the factors which caused her candidacy 
to be placed on hold, indicated that her "professional" prob-
lems would be solved if_she would "walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry." Id., at 1117 (footnote omitted). As the 
Court of Appeals characterized it, Ann Hopkins proved that 
Price Waterhouse "permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes to-
wards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable, 
role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner." 
263 U. S. App. D. C., at 324, 825 F. 2d, at 461. 
At this point Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as 
it could go. She had proved discriminatory input into the 
decisional process, and had proved that participants in the 
process considered her failure to conform to the stereotypes 
credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a sub-
stantial factor in the decision. It is as if Ann Hopkins were 
sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership deci-
sions were being made. As the partners filed in to consider 
her candidacy, she heard several of them them make sexist 
remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. As the 
decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those 
privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was a 
major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid. If, as 
we noted in Teamsters, "[p]resumptions shifting the burden 
of proof are of ten created to reflect judicial evaluations of 
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probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to 
the proof," 431 U. S., at 359, n. 45, one would be hard 
pressed to think of a situation where it would be more appro-
priate to require the defendant to show that its decision 
would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns. 
Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of 
the lower courts that respondent here is not alone in her in-
ability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her 
injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role 
in the decisional process. Many of these courts, which deal 
with the evidentiary issues in Title VII cases on a regular 
basis, have concluded that placing the risk of nonpersuasion 
on the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causa-
tion has been created by its consideration of an illegitimate 
criterion makes sense as a rule of evidence and furthers the 
substantive command of Title VII. See, e. g. , Bell v. Bir-
mingham Linen Service, 715 F. 2d 1552, 1556 (CAll 1983) 
(Tjoflat, J.) ("It would be illogical, indeed ironic, to hold a 
Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant's · 
intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or 
to allow a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely 
articulating, but not proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its action"). Particularly in the context of the 
professional world, where decisions are of ten made by colle-
gial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requir-
ing the plaintiff to prove that any one factor was the defin-
itive cause of the decisionmakers' action may be tantamount 
to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions. See, 
e. g., Fields v. Clark University, 817 F . 2d 931, 935-937 
(CAl 1987) (where plaintiff produced "strong evidence" that 
sexist attitudes infected faculty tenure decision burden prop-
erly shifted to defendant to show that it would have reached 
the same decision absent discrimination); Thompkins v. Mor-
ris Brown College, 752 F. 2d 558,563 (CAll 1985) (direct evi-
dence of discriminatory animus in decision to discharge col-
lege professor shifted burden of persuasion to defendant). 
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Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the burden to 
the defendant where the plaintiff has shown that an illegiti-
mate criterion was a "substantial factor" in the employment 
decision will not conflict with other congressional policies em-
bodied in Title VII. Title VII expressly provides that an 
employer need not give preferential treatment to employees 
or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin in order to maintain a work force in balance with the gen-
eral population. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(j). The inter-
pretive memorandum, whose authoritative force is noted by 
the plurality, see ante, at 13, n. 8, specifically provides: 
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer main-
tain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any 
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever 
such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII 
because maintaining such a balance would require an em-
ployer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race." 110 
Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). 
Last Term, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U. S. -- (1988), the Court unanimously concluded that the 
disparate impact analysis first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), should be extended to sub-
jective or discretionary selection processes. At the same 
time a plurality of the Court indicated concern that the focus 
on bare statistics in the disparate impact setting could force 
employers to adopt "inappropriate prophylactic measures" in 
violation of§ 2000e-2(j). The plurality went on to emphasize 
that in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply 
point to a statistical disparity in the employer's work force. 
Instead, the plaintiff must identify a particular employment 
practice and "must offer statistical evidence of a kind and 
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has 
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions be-
cause of their membership in a protected group." 487 U. S., 
at --. The plurality indicated that "the ultimate burden of 
proving that discrimination against a protected group has 
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been caused by a specific employment practice remains with 
the plaintiff at all times." Id., at--. 
I believe there are significant differences between shifting 
the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting 
purely on statistical proof as in the disparate impact setting 
and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like this one, 
where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that 
an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particu-
lar employment decision. First, the explicit consideration of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employ-
ment decisions "was the most obvious evil Congress had in 
mind when it enacted Title VII." Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 
335, n. 15. While the prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in 
an impact case may both be indicators of discrimination or its 
''functional equivalent," they are not, in and of themselves, 
the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment 
setting. Second, shifting the burden of persuasion to the 
employer in a situation like this one creates no incentive 
to preferential treatment in violation of § 2000e-(2)(j). To 
avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the em-
ployer need not seek racial or sexual balance in its work 
force; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on 
forbidden criteria in making its employment decisions. 
While the danger of forcing employers to engage in un-
warranted preferential treatment is thus less dramatic in 
this setting than in the situation the Court faced in Watson, 
it is far from wholly illusory. Based on its misreading of 
the words ''because of" in the statute, see ante, at 9-12, the 
plurality appears to conclude that if a decisional process is 
''tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, the em-
ployer has violated the statute, and Title VII thus commands 
that the burden shift to the ·employer to justify its decision. 
Ante, at 21-22. The plurality thus effectively reads the cau-
sation requirement out of the statute, and then replaces it 
with an "affirmative defense." Ante, at 15-17. 
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In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the 
issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment 
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate 
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision. As the 
Court of Appeals noted below, "[w]hile most circuits have not 
confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those 
that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated 
by direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a sig-
nificant or substantial role in the employment decision, the 
burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision would 
have been the same absent discrimination." 263 U. S. App. 
D. C., at 233-244, 825 F. 2d, at 470-471. Requiring that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that an illegitimate factor played a sub-
stantial role in the employment decision identifies those em-
ployment situations where the deterrent purpose of Title VII 
is most clearly implicated. As an evidentiary matter, where 
a plaintiff has made this type of strong showing of illicit moti-
vation, the fact:finder is entitled to presume that the employ-
er's discriminatory animus made a difference to the outcome, 
absent proof to the contrary from the employer. Where a 
disparate treatment plaintiff has made such a showing, the 
burden then rests with the employer to convince the trier of 
fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would 
have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate 
factor. The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the 
decision, rather it must demonstrate that with the illegiti-
mate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business 
reasons would have induced it to take the same employment 
action. This evidentiary scheme essentially requires the em-
ployer to place the employee in the same position he or she 
would have occupied absent discrimination. Cf. Mt. Healthy 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 286 (1977). If 
the employer fails to carry this burden, the fact:finder is justi-
fied in concluding that the decision was made "because of" 
consideration of the illegitimate factor and the substantive 
standard for liability under the statute is satisfied. 
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Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps pro-
bative of sexual harassment, see Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 63-69 (1986), cannot justify requiring 
the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions 
were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by 
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unre-
lated to the decisional process itself suffice to satisfy the 
plaintiff's burden in this regard. In addition, in my view tes-
timony such as Dr. Fiske's in this case, standing alone, would 
not justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer. 
Race and gender always "play a role" in an employment deci-
sion in the benign sense that these are human characteristics 
of which decisionmakers are aware and may comment on in a 
perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion; · -For exam-
ple, in the context of this case, a mere reference to "a lady 
candidate" might show that gender "played a role" in the de-
cision, but by no means could support a rational factfinder's 
inference that the decision was made "because of" sex. 
What is-required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct 
evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative re-
liance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision. 
It should be obvious that the threshold standard I would 
adopt for shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant 
differs substantially from that proposed by the plurality, the 
plurality's suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding. See 
ante, at 20, n. 13. The plurality proceeds from the premise 
that the words "because of" in the statute do not embody any 
causal requirement at all. Under my approach, the plaintiff 
must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate 
criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employ-
ment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an 
inference that the decision was made "because of" the plain-
tiff's protected status. Only then would the burden of proof 
shift to the defendant to prove that the decision would have 
been justified by other, wholly legitimate considerations. 
See also ante, at 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). 
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In sum, because of the concerns outlined above, and be-
cause I believe that the deterrent purpose of Title VII is 
disserved by a rule which places the burden of proof on plain-
tiffs on the issue of causation in all circumstances, I would 
retain but supplement the framework we established in Mc-
Donnell Douglas and subsequent cases. The structure of 
the presentation of evidence in an individual treatment case 
should conform to the general outlines we established in Mc-
Donnell Douglas and Burdine. First, the plaintiff must es-
tablish the McDonell Douglas prima facie case by showing 
membership in a protected group, qualification for the job, 
rejection for the position, and that after rejection the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants of complainant's general 
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas-,-411 U. S., at 802. The 
plaintiff should also present any direct evidence of discrimi-
natory animus in the decisional process. The defendant 
should then present its case, including its evidence as to le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment de-
cision. As the dissent notes, under this framework, the em-
ployer ''has every incentive to convince the trier of fact that 
the decision was lawful." Post, at 14, citing Bu1·dine, 450 
U. S., at 258. Once all the evidence has been received, the 
court should determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or 
Price Waterhouse framework properly applies to the evi-
dence before it. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Price 
Waterhouse threshold, the case should be decided under the 
principles enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, 
with the plaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion on the ul-
timate issue whether the employment action was taken be-
cause of discrimination. In my view, such a system is both 
fair and workable and it calibrates the evidentiary require-
ments demanded of the parties to the goals behind the stat-
ute itself. 
I agree with the dissent, see post, at 14-15, n. 4, that the 
evidentiary framework I propose should be available to all 
disparate treatment plaintiffs where an illegitimate consid-
) "' 
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eration played a substantial role in an adverse employment 
decision. The Court's allocation of the burden of proof in 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627 
(1987), rested squarely on "the analytical framework set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas," id., at 626, which we alter today. 
It would be odd to say the least if the evidentiary rules ap-
plicable to Title VII actions were themselves dependent on 
the gender or the skin color of the litigants. But see, ante, 
at 8, n. 3. 
In this case, I agree with the plurality that petitioner 
should be called upon to show that the outcome would have 
been the same if respondent's professional merit had been its 
only concern. On remand, the District Court should deter-
mine whether Price Waterhouse has shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that jf gender had not been part of the 
process, its employment decision concerning Ann Hopkins 
would nonetheless have been the same. 

